West, and mis-transcribed the word "programattic", as examples of errors. 2 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3 COUNTY OF NEW YORK: TRIAL TERM PART 6 4 5 LANDMARK WEST, INC., 103 CENTRAL PARK WEST CORP., 18 OWNERS CORP., 91 CENTRAL PARK WEST CORP. AND THOMAS HANSEN, 6 Plaintiffs 7 - against -8 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS, NYC 9 PLANNING COMMISSION, HON. ANDREW CUOMO, AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND CONGREGATION SHEARITH ISRAEL, 10 Defendants 11 12 13 Index No. 650354-2008 14 15 NIZAM PETER KETTANEH and HOWARD LEPOW, 16 Petitioner 17 against -18 BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 19 MEENAKSHI SRINIVASAN, CHAIR, CHRISTOPHER COLLINS, VICE-CHAIR, AND CONGREGATION SHEARITH ISRAEL a/k/a THE 20 TRUSTEES OF CONGREGATION SHEARITH ISRAEL IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 21 Respondents 22 23 24 Index No. 113227-08 25 March 31, 2009 60 Centre Street 26 New York, New York 10007 Lester Isaacs - Official Court Reporter

Note: This transcript is not exact and did not benefit from a recording of the hearing. In many instances, the stenographer confused Landmarks Preservation Commission and Landmark

2 3 BEFORE: HON. JOAN B. LOBIS, Justice. 4 APPEARANCES: 5 MARCUS, ROSENBERG & DIAMOND, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff Landmark West, Inc. 7 488 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10022 BY: DAVID ROSENBERG, ESQ. 9 ALAN D. SUGARMAN, ESQ. 10 Attorneys for Petitioners NIZAM PETER KETTANEH and HOWARD LEPOW, 11 17 West 70th Street - Suite 4 New York, New York 10023 12 PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP 13 Attorneys for Defendants CONGREGATION SHEARITH ISRAEL and SHELLY FRIEDMAN 14 1585 Broadway New York, New York 10036 15 CLAUDE M. MILLMAN, ESQ. BY: 16 NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT Attorneys for The Office of the Corporation Counsel 17 Attorneys for Defendants THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 18 BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS, NYC PLANNING COMMISSION, 19 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007-2601, 20 CHRISTINA HOGGAN, Assistant Corporation Counsel 21 22 23 24 25 26

Proceedings

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THE COURT: For the record. Today I will have argument on two cases that are slightly different in procedural posture, both involve around the determination by the Board of Standards to grant variances to the a building and zoning code to allow accommodation to Congregation Shearith Israel to proceed with construction of a nine story building on property that fronts on West 70th Street, is that correct? And the synagogue that occupies the corner of 70th and Central Park West, and is a landmark structure sometime referred to as the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue.

This is an Article 78 brought by two individual petitioners to have this Court set aside the determination of the Board of Standards on an Article 78 standard, under Article 78 standard.

The other case that is Landmark West versus the City, includes a cause of action against the Commission, which is now the caption of the 78. It's not completely the defendant or that's not really true?

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct.

THE COURT: So the variances are all of the Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

1 Proceedings 2 defendants represented in Landmark here today, are 3 they all here? 4 MR. ROSENBERG: They are here. Thev are all 5 represented by the same counsel, which is the 6 Corporation Counsel and the City of New York. 7 THE COURT: Also covering? 8 MR. ROSENBERG: Congregation Shearith Israel. 9 MS. HOGGAN: I don't represent the Congregation. 10 THE COURT: That's one part in the second case. 11 Are they involved with the defendant? 12 MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, plaintiff named the 13 Attorney General, because we raised constitutional 14 issues and we have not received any communication 15 from the Office of the Attorney General. 16 THE COURT: And they were served with the 17 motion? 18 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, they were served with the 19 complaint. We served them with our responsive 20 motion, I think the motion was served. 21 THE COURT: Do we have any idea if they are 22 taking no position, or are they defaulting? 23 MS. HOGGAN: They never appeared, that's why I 24 guess, they never appeared in the case. 25 THE COURT: It's one of those probable cases 26 that we have to tie up before any decision can be Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

reached.

What I would like to do now is briefly address the differences between the Article 78 by the two individuals and the Landmark West case which is different. I assume, that basically why the Landmarks is a 78 is because it's 78 is more narrow, but you were timely in bringing the action so there would be no impediment to converting it as a 78; is that correct?

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: What are the other issues, to set aside zoning provisions itself, is that what it is?

MR. ROSENBERG: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you explain the difference?

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, I don't know everything that's in their papers. Yesterday I received from Mr. Sugarman, the attorney for the plaintiff in the other case, I think a couple thousand pages of documents, which I had not seen previous. So I'm not fully familiar with their case. I wasn't served with the papers in that case.

THE COURT: But what I thought I could do today, I would be able to do, is to combine the two arguments.

Proceedings

MR. ROSENBERG: I don't know. I know that my case -- I don't know what the differences between their cases are.

THE COURT: Counsel for the City, since you're involved in both cases and you're moving to dismiss, anyone that's in the Landmark case.

MS. HOGGAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Can you distinguish the differences between the two cases?

MS. HOGGAN: If you give me a minute.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SUGARMAN: Your Honor, if I may. While counsel is looking at our papers, would you like my view?

THE COURT: My law secretary, Ms. Sugarman, we determined that there was no relationship.

MR. SUGARMAN: None at all.

THE COURT: Unless you're trying to get me off the case?

MR. SUGARMAN: No. I think one of the important issues in the case is the problem in the City Planning, the Department of City Planning. With Landmarks, the have over seen jurisdiction over granting waivers of the zoning laws for the purpose based upon Landmark's hardships, that's not what is

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Proceedings

BSA. So the landmark question as to them, as a defendant and properly so, we believe we raise the same issue.

THE COURT: If I understand it, in reviewing. I made a start review, I have not read everything. I have read mostly the papers in the Kettaneh, but not in the Landmark cases, I thought Landmark approved it.

MR. SUGARMAN: Landmark approved the project from the point of view of from the certificate appropriateness. They do not look at the Zoning Law. They are specifically prohibited from doing this. Landmark has a whole separate procedure of 74, 711 where they consider the hardship by the applicant. And the applicant has to show their financial hardship. They have to show that information and generally their encumbrances and other conditions put on the property, as part of that process, and then it's pursued. But the Department of City Planning, that's to get a waiver of the Zoning Laws, that the Board of Standards and Appeals is not involved in that process.

This applicant started off in 2001, that's when the case started, asking for 74 711 relief from Landmarks and for whatever reason they withdraw it Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

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Proceedings

because it was telegraphed to them they weren't going to get it.

THE COURT: So as to the project.

MR. SUGARMAN: To get a waiver of Zoning Laws, so the Landmarks Commission did -- they said, look this is the maximum height that we think architecturally it will fit here. We are not making any determination as to the other requirements for obtaining a variance under the Zoning Law. And you guys go to the BSA and see if you can prove to them that you meet those standards. But they didn't take the position or whether or not they meet the standards.

Did they receive much of the evidence that would apply to those standards. For example, Landmarks was never advised that windows could be blocked up in the adjoining building. That's an issue to be considered by the BSA.

THE COURT: But if the BSA, I guess I need some background on BSA between Landmark and who trumps whom? If one doesn't know, can landmark say no to the variance?

MS. HOGGAN: That's why I have to go to

Landmark. They, an applicant, would go because they

are the Landmark. They go get a certificate of

Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

1 Proceedings 2 appropriateness from Landmarks. Then they have --3 THE COURT: They have it. 4 MS. HOGGAN: They have it, it's not an issue. 5 They go to BSA. They apply for the variances, 6 which I don't thing the procedural is incorrect. 7 It's fine, it's represented. 8 THE COURT: If Landmark says it's okay from what 9 they saw, it goes to the Board of Standards and 10 Appeals, that's where the fight has been in the 11 community apparently, is that it? 12 MS. HOGGAN: Yes, that's what the hearing is 13 for, that's what the determination is. 14 THE COURT: But that's where the 78 comes in, 15 because the Board has approved the variance to a 16 project that is a nine story project? 17 MR. SUGARMAN: Yes. 18 THE COURT: They have to go back to Landmark at 19 this point? 20 MS. HOGGAN: No. 21 MR. SUGARMAN: Not technically for a rubber 22 stamp, but it goes back. Landmarks had trumped the 23 BSA, if they go through the 78, 711 process, but 24 that's not done here. 25 THE COURT: So they have a choice? 26 No, if you want to use Landmark MR. SUGARMAN: Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

as a hardship you have to go through the Landmark Commission. There is nothing in the variance part of the zoning resolution for variances that recognizes landmarking as a hardship, because if you were to do that, then that would make 74 711 meaningless among other things.

MR. ROSENBERG: We are on accord on that point, at least one of them is clearly on accord.

The other point is that the only agencies that are permitted to grant relief under the City Charter are either the City Planning Commission or Landmarks itself. You can't then go to the BSA and in order to argue I'm a Landmark, so therefore, I'm holding a special variance.

THE COURT: That's not what they did.

MR. ROSENBERG: They did.

THE COURT: I thought they went based on the standards that are incorporated in the zoning themselves?

MR. SUGARMAN: On the surface it would look like that, but they actually new landmarking hardships — as part of the evidence for finding A or B, finding A is the hardship finding. So they used the Landmark hardship as the hardship under defining A, which is not permitted.

Proceedings

Number two, they did something very different.

Finding A requirement in order to obtain a

variance request and the first thing that has to be
shown in the New York City law.

THE COURT: Is finding first A?

MR. SUGARMAN: Yes, first finding A. The applicant has to show a hardship or practical difficulty. It has to arise out of a physical condition.

THE COURT: That can't be, because it's a Landmark building and it's on adjoining property.

MR. SUGARMAN: That's one of our points, yes, your Honor.

Most important is the causation issue here. The hardship or difficulty has to single out, how it will be related to the Zoning Law. In other words, the hardship has to arise out of the strict application of the Zoning Law. You can't just say oh, we have this hardship with access to circulation and therefore we meet finding A. You can't do that because if the access of circulation as is here can be fully resolved by what's called an asset right on conforming a building or that condition or hardship cannot arise out of the strict application of the Zoning Law, because the Zoning Law fully permits them

to resolve that issue.

What they did with landmarking though they tried to make that a condition, but more importantly in a very subtle way and the finding B, which is the reasonable return part. What they have to show is that their building cannot earn a reasonable return, a for profit building.

Proceedings

THE COURT: That's the question I have about the two differences, if it's considered a religious not for profit or a for profit, because it's five stories of condominium.

MR. SUGARMAN: The way the BSA looked at it, we agree the lower floors which really, your Honor, only represent ten percent of the variances here.

THE COURT: That's the set back.

MR. SUGARMAN: That's the ten feet set back.

Most of the variance relates to the profit, the

luxury condominium. So that's 90 percent of the

case. So, for that they have to earn, they have to

be able to show that they can't earn if they comply

with the zoning.

THE COURT: Is there any dispute about that standard applying? Because that's the question that I had, when I was looking at it, because it's a religious building and the argument they don't really Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

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have to make is a showing and that they are kind of sitting back on their religious part, for the rest of the building.

MR. MILLMAN: The way we look at it, we look to the statute itself. Here is what the statute said in 7221 (B) which is the place where it talks about reasonable -- it says quote, this finding shall not be required for the granting of a variance to a nonprofit organization.

It does not say to a nonprofit organization when it's pursuing something related to its program.

For example, if you were dealing with Lincoln Center and it's a nonprofit organization they were seeking a variance, you wouldn't have some special rules to deal with the fact that part of the theatre is involved. A restaurant, which doesn't relate to the theatre directly, even though that's there for profit -- not for profit, but for financial gain. that can be restored to the mission of the non-for-profit.

THE COURT: Then what is the Board of Standards asking for?

MR. MILLMAN: What they did, what they said, what we would like to do is separate the project into two basement floors.

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Proceedings

THE COURT: They want to do this expansive and somewhat complicated evaluation?

MR. MILLMAN: They believe, even though the statute says non-for-profit organization, didn't talk about the specific view. They believe that it makes sense in this kind of a situation to separate out the analysis, but that as we have the benefit here on review, your Honor, of being able to uphold them either because in fact the statute says that you don't have to do that or because in fact they found that a smaller amount of residential use, any smaller, would be as an as of right use would actually result in a loss. And they looked at the expert reports provided by the congregation indicating there would be a loss and they found those reported to be persuasive.

THE COURT: There is two very different issues here, that's one, because it's a synagogue or non-for-profit you never have to make the reasonable return analysis. And then I think it's your argument that they did the wrong analysis once they got to it, they used the wrong standard for rate of return or valuation.

MR. SUGARMAN: That's part of it. We will get to that in more detail, that's part of our argument.

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Proceedings

But if you were to -- first of all, I think what the Board of Standards and Appeal did was proper or what they did was they looked at all the case law that applies to variances and taking the constitutional So when this was written, no one was looking at multi level buildings and things like that, air rights. And that logically it doesn't make sense. know the synagogue wants to have a strict reading of B, but they don't want to have a strict reading of A, which says physical condition. But it's the congregation's position here that if they are going to take this position that B doesn't apply at all, then it's clear. If you go to the constitutional law on this, in the Penn Central case, they are able to accommodate the needs of the congregation in an as of right building, with a ten percent variance. But in a as of right building, if they are coming into a pure nonprofit, then they will say forget about money. Can you resolve your needs in a conforming building. The answer is, yes. According to their own testimony, except for property, ten percent.

THE COURT: That will get to the difference of whether I'm doing a de novo view of what was before the Board of Standards or the arbitration or the other standard for a review on an Article 78, because Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

you're saying as a matter of law, that they don't get past A.

MR. SUGARMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: But if you get past A, then there is a determination how they apply B. Is that pretty much a short hand way?

MR. SUGARMAN: Not only affirmatives, I don't know if your Honor got to the answer and reply. They actually admit now they do earn a reasonable return on a conforming building. I can go through it, I have some exhibits, also some posters which are copies of the exhibits.

THE COURT: I mean, I have got all this stuff upstairs, these are parts of the yellow bound book?

MR. SUGARMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you walk me through that now. I would like to get through the differences between the two.

MR. SUGARMAN: Well, real quickly, we did start off asking questions about Landmark and that got into the finding B. What they did was they used the fact that the adjoining property was Landmark to increase the site value on the development site.

THE COURT: They did that by saying they can't develop.

Proceedings

MR. SUGARMAN: The area of the parsonage. But increasing that value they make it impossible to earn a reasonable return.

I don't know if the respondents will now concede but 90 percent of this building, are variances.

There are the read, and the blue are the ones for the community house.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SUGARMAN: You can look at that and see there is a disproportion.

The other thing, this is the first floor and under the first floor, New York City law gives community organizations like this, the right to fill up the entire lot. Why is that significant here.

First, it's an accommodation, but secondly this is where all the access -- most of the access of circulation arise.

THE COURT: Let's jump to something that doesn't seem to be really argued by petitioner, which is that there is really no impact, except for the height of the building on the community.

The central character of the neighborhood, it's really the height. If they have a community center and they rent the center to a school, that will change the characteristics.

Proceedings

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MR. SUGARMAN: We did not make that argument. We concede that we would be quite happy to have the congregation build a community center, rent it out to a school, if they want, if they need the income.

THE COURT: At sometime you said it was for a school.

MR. SUGARMAN: The conforming ability allows them to go 75 feet, not on all the floors, or ten feet high. The building, they are proposing first for the community place, the next four are here. The next two floors are the condominium. That's all within the conforming.

MR. MILLMAN: Your Honor, the as of right structure.

THE COURT: Can you say your name?

MR. MILLMAN: Claude Millman, for the The as of right structure that Mr. congregation. Sugarman is describing was actually found by BSA to be insufficient to solve even the problematic needs, the religious needs of the congregation.

THE COURT: Where did they make that?

MR. MILLMAN: Where did they make that finding?

THE COURT:

MR. MILLMAN: As to the three floors, you have that finding, Paragraph 68.

Proceedings

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THE COURT: If they did a higher building, but not the nine story building.

MR. MILLMAN: They specifically found that an as of right structure which is the one that the petitioner is describing would not -- because of various foot prints and also the space that would be needed for school space would not be sufficient.

MR. ROSENBERG: But he is talking about a different variance, about a variance.

> MR. MILLMAN: No.

MR. SUGARMAN: You have to show me how these variances here, Mr. Millman, related to the problematic needs?

THE COURT: Why don't you take a couple of minutes to see about a presentation. Why, as a matter of law, this has to be reversed because it's arbitrary and capricious, and then I want to have a question. I think counsel was looking to answer when we went totally in another direction.

MR. SUGARMAN: There are six thousand pages of records.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. SUGARMAN: So we can get a visual, these are the two floors in the conforming building. The top two floors. They can build as of right. And our Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

position on the 10 percent variances is that these uses could be moved up here.

There is one use or which is the caretakers apartment on the fourth floor can easily be moved to these other two floors and the BSA did not pay any attention to that.

MR. MILLMAN: These are the arguments, your Honor, that were in fact made to the board and the board rejected moving those things up.

THE COURT: I'm fascinated with the underlying facts. I'm not actually doing that kind of review, that's one of the things that I wanted to focus on. This is just to help me understand what the controversy has been, its been a long standing controversy.

MS. HOGGAN: Legally, we can't tell a religious organization, please move your child care center from the first floor to the fifth floor. It's not proper. There is case after case that I cited them, it's not proper.

MR. ROSENBERG: One of the points in our case, is that that's a difference to a religious institution.

THE COURT: Is constitutional.

MR. ROSENBERG: That's a clear constitutional Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

matter.

THE COURT: There was a dissent recently in one of the Court of Appeals cases, that the difference is no longer one in the twenty first century, that should have a plan to give various ways in which to develop property.

MR. SUGARMAN: Your Honor, we have cited many cases where the court's have scrutinized what religious operations do, and they are in our briefs and there are cases on both sides.

THE COURT: If it ended up that there was no impediment to the synagogue doing what it wanted for its community needs and issues, and the need to have the entrance way for the community, and the value of having a religious school, although not affiliated with the synagogue there for the congregants, you still can't do that within the building, that they continue to go up?

MR. MILLMAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What don't you get if you do the building this way?

MR. SUGARMAN: What you do not get?

MR. MILLMAN: What the Board found, you would have to move us higher up in the building.

THE COURT: Like what, parcels? The apartments?

Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

MR. MILLMAN: There are various options. One of the options were discussed, have the caretaker apartment up. The board found that and there was evidence you need to have a caretaker closer down in order to be more responsive to various historical objects that are in the synagogue, also as to emergencies that are in the synagogue.

MR. SUGARMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let him speak, he hasn't had the floor at all. Other than the fact that it may take a caretaker a couple of minutes to get down to the synagogue area, what are the other things that the congregation couldn't do.

MR. MILLMAN: I think I'm able to go through every single one of them. But I think the main point is this, your Honor. There were six hearings where every one was present, the Landmark would like to challenge deference. In fact, the Board mentioned deference, but they required all sorts of submissions like how the facilities would be used.

There was testimony where witnesses said that they stood in front of the synagogue, believe it or not, and them walking in, whether they were disabled. Ultimately all that evidence, roughly 7,000 pages was related to the Board. They are the ones who made the Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

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Proceedings

decision on this and they concluded that from a Paragraph 68 of their finding. They said that there is evidence here that from a programmatic point of view the variances were required.

THE COURT: Other than relying on the Standards because it's what the City is doing. Can the accommodation address the first point about the way the the Board considered the first of the five findings, that the court has to make. What is that argument? That's just not to the deference of the Board, but a clear arbitrary capricious determination of the law.

MR. MILLMAN: I think there is an assumption that it's incorrect to begin with.

First of all, the property, the property for zoning purposes, your Honor, is not what's called lot 37 which is the property. That's off a little bit from Central Park West. Every one has agreed here that for zoning purposes, at least one merged lot for zoning purposes. What you have here is a lot on the corner, is a very important and hystoric synagogue, you have also very old parsonage, slightly to the South and slightly to the west.

You have this community center that is of no significance, and then an empty lot. So if one were Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

to preserve the synagogue and, yes, it landmarked, but its also central to the mission of a non-for-profit, that is making the application here.

There whole point of being, they only exist by virtue of their hystoric relationship to this building and so put aside landmark. It would destroy their mission, to take down that building.

THE COURT: Is this the zoning?

MR. MILLMAN: Your Honor, this is part of the record in this, the history of the building is actually of significance.

THE COURT: Is of significance, but the congregation could theoretically --

MR. ROSENBERG: Not only could, but they went from downtown and moved progressively uptown as the population moved. This is not the original synagogue of the congregation. It's a lovely synagogue, it's to preserve it, it's landmarked.

MR. MILLMAN: Their preserving of the synagogue, it is not the site of the synagogue, so the landmarks they would still want to preserve the synagogue.

THE COURT: That's irrelevant.

MR. MILLMAN: The purposes of the A finding in terms of physical, the physical conditions, it's very important because what it means is that you have a Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

piece of property that is taken up. All there is, is a lot of development space. There si 144,000 square feet of development space. That's that vast part, that is taken up. But, this building you want to keep, you end up with a little L shape face to build upon.

It was concluded that one part of the L, where the parsonage is, is a little small to go on and they have you end up with a community house and the strip of vacant property.

It was concluded by the BSA, unless you develope something there and what you are allowed to use, you would not solved the problematic use of the synagogue. You would not be able to address or access the classrooms, the achieves offices, things like that.

In addition to that, the synagogue would ask that they place some apartments only in the end. They originally were seeking 14 floors, your Honor, but in the end after going through a seven years process, with Landmarks before BSA and hearing the community, not only was there a change from 14 to eight and a mall penthouse, but in addition it was also altered so that there could be a courtyard.

This process worked, your Honor. The A finding Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

is met here, because there is a historic building on the site.

There is also a zoning boundry that runs right through the middle of the site, which is very unusual for normally zoning lots have their own zone.

And, in addition, the community center building itself is completely obsolete. There is no accessibility to the synagogue. But my point, your Honor, those are the A findings.

And, in addition, there is case law that says you don't even need a physical impediment when you are dealing with a nonprofit religious organization. So there is no basis for upsetting that A finding.

MR. ROSENBERG: He says we don't need the A finding. We satisfied the A finding for the Landmark. The Landmark is not a unique physical condition that wants a variance.

THE COURT: But the actual lot they mentioned to building on, they argued.

MR. SUGARMAN: It's three brownstone lots, they can go down two levels.

MR. ROSENBERG: It's not unusual.

MR. SUGARMAN: It's a perfect lot.

MR. ROSENBERG: What they have not addressed is this unique area is not used for other things, they Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

aren't, it's out. It's a property for unrelated use and so some feel that should be included in the custodial part.

THE COURT: But the needs -- I may actually have to you come back again, but I may not, because it's a pretty complicated and obviously an enormous amount of thinking and time went into the record that has already been created on this. What is needed to understand -- the way I have to understand it, with them going to what is requested in both actions.

Let's get back to why I started asking the City about and wrap it up. For now I'll give you a couple of minutes to highlight whatever you would like.

Counsel for the City, what do you think the differences are between the two cases.

MS. HOGGAN: There is two differences that are primarily one, there is jurisdictional grounds that are raised in Landmark. That is not in the other case, but it is not BSA, couldn't even hear the application.

Also in terms of how they framed their argument. The essence is the same regarding the job prints and as far as the application of, but if you couch it in a program, there is a primary factual constitutional aspect --

Proceedings

THE COURT: The fact that there is a constitutional aspect to Landmarks, the fact that they mention your motion to dismiss the Landmark action, it wasn't served on the State, so there is a bit of a problem.

MR. MILLMAN: I think we can fix that, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're going to have to.

MR. MILLMAN: I think that the key here on the motion to dismiss is that while they just couch their argument, I actually think that the case law is essentially the same while they couch the Landmark, they couched their argument in a constitutional way, in a code of constitutional claim.

What in fact, what they are saying, the Board of Standards and Appeals didn't follow its statutory obligations. They are not saying that the fact sheet itself is unconstitutional, when you're arguing that the statute is unconstitutional, that's when you notify the Attorney General. That's when you have been seeking a declaratory judgment.

THE COURT: There is as an applied argument.

MR. MILLMAN: I don't think it's an applied argument. The statute as applied, is unconstitutional, they are saying the statute itself Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

is not observed. That the requirements of the constitutionality are not observed, that's simply a statutory reference.

I think as to, I suppose if the Board of Standards and Appeals does not follow what is constitutionally required to do, then there may be circumstances in which the constitution is abridged. However, that doesn't make it a constitutional argument. What the First Department said on the issue, it says where the issue is the propriety of the proceeding taken under and other wise, states an Article 78 proceeding is the proper vehicle. That's as to the Rosenthaul case, cited on page three of our reply brief in that motion. It cites a Sulnick decision from the New York Court of Appeals and over and over again the declaratory judgment they dismiss.

THE COURT: Or converted?

MR. MILLMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Or converted.

MR. MILLMAN: Or converted yes, your Honor.

Because the fact that no claim is being made that the statute was unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Rosenberg as to that.

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor has the right to Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

convert it, but there are numerous cases that come down everyday. I just looked on line the other day where the courts, especially the Appellate Division have treated actions like this and they quote, they say, it's in part like a 78 and in part it's like a declaratory judgment — as where such declaratory relief as to the underlying jurisdiction of the BSA in this case and it's not an Article 78.

THE COURT: Can you argue that a little bit, what is your claim with jurisdiction.

MR. ROSENBERG: There are a couple of claims, one is that the termination, which is the basis for the application for the variance.

In other words, to get to the BSA, one must first go to the Department of Buildings and get rejections, then appeal that to the BSA and that's what gives the BSA jurisdiction under the City Charter. In the City Charter it expressly says that rejections must be issued by either the Commissioner of Buildings or what used to be cured by the Borough supervisor, the debuty commissioner for, in this case the Borough of Manhattan.

In this case the document which they relied upon as the ticket to get to the BSA was signed by some person in a civil service line, who had not been

Proceedings

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delegated the authority.

THE COURT: You are saying there was an action taken by the the Department of Buildings and that triggered the next step?

THE WITNESS: No, the statute says it must be triggered by a document signed either by the Commission of Buildings or the Borough supervisor or the Borough Commissioner, as it is now in court.

THE COURT: Is there anyone that can comment on that.

MS. HOGGAN: We actually have jurisdiction under the Charter, under 668 that's the problem, but it was procedural, it's just in the statute.

MR. MILLMAN: The Board's point, the Board of Standards and Appeals addressed these and explains why it felt it had jurisdiction.

MR. ROSENBERG: But that doesn't mean it does, that's for the Court to determine.

The second point on jurisdiction, that the plans that they claim had been presented to and rejected by the Department of Buildings, which resulted in the list of objections from the Department of Buildings presented a base for the application for the variance of the Board of Standards and Appeals. Those plans are not the plans that were presented to the Board of

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Proceedings

Standards and Appeals, and they admitted on the record the attorneys for the congregation, Shelly Freedman admitted on the record, we have the quote in the document itself, it's actually in the complaint that this was not the same set of plans, that's the second jurisdictional claim.

THE COURT: Let me go over that once again, so that diminish it or is it a whole different concept that they are talking about?

MR. MILLMAN: What happened was, your Honor, there was a change in the plans that were made in order to obviate one of the objections. The Department of Buildings' objection and after that the Department of Buildings just cut one of their objections back, so that relief was required. It's not like a something was being submitted to the BSA, it's the opposite.

THE COURT: So you're arguing that it is something that has to be strictly construed, but it has to be the identical plans, where they can move forward.

MR. ROSENBERG: They never put before the BSA this whole process that he committed a second set of plans to remove this objection. None of that was in the record, ministerially the objections disappeared.

1 Proceedings 2 THE COURT: But doesn't that indicate what was 3 done? 4 MR. ROSENBERG: We didn't get the plans. 5 MS. HOGGAN: Your Honor, it was --6 MR. SUGARMAN: Your Honor, can I? 7 THE COURT: It gets too confusing when you jump 8 in. 9 MR. SUGARMAN: I'm sorry. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Rosenberg, that's a 11 jurisdictional issue. 12 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: The other problem is, she was 1.4 asserting that the need to get the best procedural, 15 the issue, the issue of the deference to the 16 religious. 17 MR. ROSENBERG: That was one of them, with 18 deference to use the Landmark status, the A which was 19 already talked about. 20 THE COURT: I am just trying to get the 21 differences between the two. 22 MR. ROSENBERG: I think the rest of the issues 23 are probably encompassed in Mr. Sugarman's petition. 24 MS. HOGGAN: I will agree. 25 THE COURT: The City, has last comment. 26 MS. HOGGAN: I actually wanted to say what BSA Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

says.

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First's in terms of the issue with regard to the motion to dismiss. Landmark says in speaking, in dealing with it as Mybrid, the only time a Mybrid, they are saying I address all the cases cited and in our reply he is misrepresenting cases. This will be simple. The only time you separate out a challenge in the constitutionality of the law, it's simply that is not being done. Everything here is in terms of the decision made by BSA and the challenge to that. I don't think each relief that he seeks, I didn't go through. I said, why and how it's an Article 78. And in terms of our Article 78 relief, but it's whether or not we attacked in essence in our jurisdiction. That's what he is really arguing here in terms of this jurisdictional argument, that clearly it is Article 78.

I think in three or four, I don't know, I think it's in my papers. So this is an Article 78. There is no difference whatsoever.

In terms of the other matter, I would like to say this was a classic process in terms of the unique characteristics, what was done was not fully presented here. The Landmark buildings were, there were two different projects for two different things.

Proceedings

For the submission of the objection. The second was for the condo portion. There were put four different In terms of religious status in terms of the characteristics, their problematic needs. is case law on that. We have cited the case law. is sufficient in terms of being a unique characteristic, and in terms of what has been referred to in terms of the Landmark being physical that's not restricted to the physical nature of the That's also the building on the lot and there is case after case against it, that the building can be considered. We did that. We considered the building, the Landmark building is Landmark. It's in the middle of the lot. It's just you can't build on that lot. It just creates a problem. We considered the fact that after the building was placed, the lot was then cut by two different zoning provisions. on one part of the lot you can have a building that is 75 feet, and another one hundred twenty-five feet in terms for width of the building, can be interpreted differently. Assume there is another problem, because there is another law. This applies to part of the property, but would then have to be extended to all of them. In terms of their problems they face the problem with circulation. They face a

Proceedings

problem where the congregation would have cute back on its programs. BSA does look at this. They did an extensive review, in terms they would have to cut back the number of children that could be provided service. The number of classrooms. The classroom side, therefore, the number of students, that they could have in that building. They wouldn't be able to cut on what was planned. In terms of the financial hardship that was looked at, I will go over it, unless you don't want me to —

THE COURT: Not on this stage. I need an analysis on what I have to do, at least on the 78 to the declaratory judgment, that's brought out over what I do need to review on an agency finding, anything.

MR. MILLMAN: Yes, your Honor. I believe your Honor that the analysis in particular on the Article 78 though I think ultimately, it's the same analysis, that was asserted, is what one does, one looks at the five findings, which is maximum, would have to be made. One says you look at the BSA decision. You see the magic words in each of the five. Then after that, you go to the 6,000, 7,000 page record and look to see whether there is some, something, someone is uttering those words in testimony or submission to

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Proceedings

the BSA. And, clearly, with respect to every single finding there is some submission.

For example, on pages 5112 through 5181, there is a submission document from the congregation, summing up all their findings that itself is evidence because it is being submitted by zoning law experts. A people who have a reptation and in effect legal recognition when they commit submissions that are not accurate to the board. It is perfectly appropriate for the Board to consider that and right after it, the financial analysis on the economics. Is point is simple, all one really has to do is look to see are the findings made? An if there is something in the record, where the is the Board?

THE COURT: That is soho.

MR. MILLMAN: That is Soho your Honor. After that work is done if there are any questions about some of them, there is a financial return. If it was questionable, that if it hadn't been an economist that submitted something, that's what we are saying had, would be a lot in as, as of rights projection. If you didn't have that, then would you look to the case law and say something about the B finding, doesn't have to be made, same thing with respect to A finding on physical impediment. They did make a

Proceedings

finding on physical impediment. They found zoning line right down the middle, which is something that was used by the court in the matter of the Elliott Case. They used the same law that was a New York Court of Appeal case issue.

You look at those things, you say are those physical impediments? They clearly are under the case law. The City claims you can look at things beyond the structure of land. Once you exclude the synagogue itself, you have an L shape piece of property.

You can look at all those things and those are physical impediments. But under the case law, you wound have to find a physical impediment.

Our view of this is almost a chart exercise, or saying the findings made, you can see them on each paragraph, is there something in the 11 volumes of materials before the BSA, where they can see something. While BSA didn't have a page number because the records were made afterwards, clearly there is something in the record for each and every one of those findings, they are not making that up.

MR. SUGARMAN: Well, the counsel for the respondent has three to four months to search their number of records. If you look at their answer they Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

cite basically to BSA resolution. The BSA resolution was the magic words they rely upon magic words presented by counsel. For the BSA in their submission to the BSA counsel for the respondent -- I'm sorry -- that's not the factual standard. There are plenty of cases that show that even BSA cannot come in and utter these conclusory findings.

THE COURT: But if the record is there, they made findings, they maybe didn't articulate enough, is that a basis for me to reverse on 78 standards?

MR. SUGARMAN: They can't show you where it is in the record. They cannot show you if the record there is a change in the Department of Buildings plans. They cannot show that to you.

They cannot show you where assess of circulation is affected. And not cured by the conforming building. In fact there own architect agreed with us that's an as of right. During their access of circulation the building, I made big mistakes. And I didn't get to lead with my most important point.

THE COURT: You get to end with it.

MR. SUGARMAN: Your Honor, there are a lot of issues with their economic study, and some of them may fall within the discretion of the BSA. But you get to a certain point where you're beyond the realm Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

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Proceedings

of reason. For example, the site value they use for the two floors of condominium, is beyond reason. that clearly kills what is called the skim man out, in the scheme city. The idea is if you have this operation, and you come in and you want a variance based upon economic needs, you have to look at the entire building.

This is the so-called all residential building. The BSA asked them to do it. They provided it. It wasn't all residential. They, putting that aside, if you look in the answer this is in my reply. have excerpts here. I don't have a poster. City, the BSA never fixed the scheme C or residential analysis. They went back and they fixed it. concluded that an all residential building would earn a six point 7 percent return.

Now, the question, your Honor, is that a reasonable return. If you read that decision over and over and over again, you will never see a reference to any greater return in the decision. Certainly not what is what is considered an adequate rate of return. They said six point 7 percent, so we went back into their record, their initial application and this here is an exhibit. R 140 in the record. It's their economic expert saying in

Proceedings

this application as an conclusion, that six point 55 percent is an adequate return. This is an annual leased return. We discussed, we didn't get into the return of equity. This is the best way you can do it, six point 55 percent, its adequate. They show in their papers, that six point 7 percent is the return they get from not even an all residential building. That's the end of finding B, they are done, that's over.

As a matter of law, because this in the record the verified answer that's in the record, there is no dispute that its in there. There is no dispute this is here. That is the end of their case.

I have other, many other points I can make.

I'll just state that 90 percent of the time what the respondents counsel said applies to 10 percent of the variance.

MR. MILLMAN: Your Honor.

MS. HOGGAN: I will say on page 55, we do address this basic argument. Just the point, bringing to counsel's attention, the rate of return was issued to be 11 percent by the congregation, and I did find the record.

We find those references to 11 percent and, this would not be a legal way of describing the

Proceedings

percentages.

MR. MILLMAN: There is a reason why the BSA in it's decision never made a finding as to what the minimum rate of return was, because what they concluded, what they concluded was that if the congregation were allowed to satisfy its needs by putting up the building, the problematic needs and adding five apartments to that or if they were then to add five apartments or two apartments. The apartments one — would only look at the apartments to determine whether or not there is some sort of rate of return. The first part, the problematic needs are clearly within the law that says you don't look at rate of return for non-for-profit. All this residential structure, okay.

What he is saying is, if the congregation decided that it doesn't care about access to the synagogue and educating its members, it, if it decides that's not important, instead just wants to go into real estate, he claims, I think the numbers are wrong. That they will then make a minimum, a very right on the edge minimum rate of return, for that residential project. That's not the question.

If your Honor would put us in that position, that would really be undermining our position.

Lester Isaacs, Official Court Reporter

Proceedings

THE COURT: At this point you have given me a lot more to look at.

MR. MILLMAN: Your Honor, would it be helpful regarding the issue of page numbers? And in the record, we could provide your Honor with very simple one page or two page identifying the findings.

THE COURT: Are they in the papers?

I'm not sure.

We have two problems. The Attorney General, the lack of the Attorney General's presence and to convert the landmark to a 78, what procedures do I have to follow to do that.

Thank you very much.

Very interesting argument.

CERTIFICATE

I, Lester Isaacs, an official court reporter of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.

> Lester Isaacs, S.C.R. Official Court Reporter.